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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
 No. 10-3022 
___________ 
 
ISPAT/INLAND, INC., 
              Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
DIRECTOR OWCP, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; 
HOWARD CURTIS 
_______________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Benefits Review Board, United States Department of Labor 
 (BRB No. 09-0356 BLA) 
______________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
 March 11, 2011 
 
 Before:  SCIRICA, AMBRO and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges. 
 
 (Filed:  April 6, 2011) 
_________________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Ispat/Inland, Inc. appeals a final judgment of the Department of Labor’s Benefits 
Review Board awarding benefits to Howard Curtis under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 
30 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (―BLBA‖). According to Ispat/Inland, the coal mine operator 
responsible for paying benefits, the administrative law judge wrongly presumed any 
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obstructive pulmonary disease in an individual with both a history of coal dust exposure 
and a longstanding smoking habit will necessarily ―arise out of‖ coal mine employment 
and therefore qualify as ―legal‖ pneumoconiosis under the statute and regulations. 
Because neither the ALJ nor the Board employed such a presumption, we will affirm.
1
  
I. 
 Congress enacted BLBA to compensate miners who are totally disabled by 
pneumoconiosis, which the statute defines as ―a chronic dust disease of the lung and its 
sequelae, including respiratory and pulmonary impairments, arising out of coal mine 
employment.‖ 30 U.S.C. §§ 901(a), 902(b). Under the statute, pneumoconiosis may be 
―clinical‖ or ―legal.‖ The former label refers to the category of diseases recognized by the 
medical community as pneumoconiosis. 20 C.F.R. § 718.201(a)(1). The latter is defined 
as ―any chronic lung disease or impairment . . . arising out of coal mine employment‖ 
including, without limitation, ―any chronic restrictive or obstructive pulmonary disease 
arising out of coal mine employment.‖ 20 C.F.R. § 718.201(a)(2). An obstructive 
pulmonary condition caused by coal-dust exposure satisfies the definition of legal   
pneumoconiosis. See id.; LaBelle Processing Co. v. Swarrow, 72 F.3d 308, 315 (3d Cir. 
1995).  
 To recover benefits under BLBA, a claimant must demonstrate (1) he suffers from 
pneumoconiosis; (2) he is ―totally disabled‖; and (3) the pneumoconiosis is a substantial 
                                                 
1
 The Board upheld the ALJ’s award and denied Ispat/Inland’s motion for 
reconsideration. We have jurisdiction under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ 
Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 921(c), which is incorporated by reference in BLBA, 30 
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contributing cause of his total disability. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 718.201–204. By definition, 
legal pneumoconiosis refers to a class of pulmonary impairments arising out of coal mine 
employment. See 30 U.S.C. § 902(b). A claimant, therefore, bears the burden of proof on 
two distinct causation inquiries — disease causation and disability causation. See 20 
C.F.R. § 725.103; Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Dep’t of Labor, 292 F.3d 849, 861 (D.C. Cir. 
2002) (―a claimant . . . bears the burden of demonstrating that he meets all of the relevant 
conditions‖). First, to qualify under the statute as an individual afflicted by ―legal‖ 
pneumoconiosis, a claimant must prove his obstructive pulmonary condition arose out of 
his coal mine employment. 20 C.F.R. § 718.201(a)(2). Subsequently, he must 
demonstrate pneumoconiosis is a ―substantially contributing cause‖ of his totally 
disabling pulmonary impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 718.204(c). Pneumoconiosis is a 
―substantially contributing cause‖ of a miner’s disability if it (1) ―[h]as a material adverse 
effect on the miner’s respiratory or pulmonary condition;‖ or (2) ―[m]aterially worsens a 
totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment which is caused by a disease or 
exposure unrelated to coal mine employment.‖ 20 C.F.R. § 718.204(c). 
 BLBA and its implementing regulations employ a number of presumptions 
―intended to ease a claimant’s burden by allowing an element of the required proof to be 
presumed from the existence of other rationally-related facts.‖ Andersen v. Dir., OWCP, 
455 F.3d 1102, 1104 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). In the realm of disease 
causation, ―[i]f a miner who is suffering or suffered from pneumoconiosis was employed 
                                                                                                                                                             
U.S.C. § 932(a).  
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for ten years or more in one or more coal mines there shall be a rebuttable presumption 
that his pneumoconiosis arose out of such employment.‖ 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(1); 20 
C.F.R. § 718.203(b).
2
 The regulations ―do[ ] not . . . create a presumption that all or even 
more obstructive disease is caused by exposure to coal dust. . . . [E]ach miner bears the 
burden of proving that his obstructive lung disease did in fact arise out of his coal mine 
employment.‖ Nat’l Mining Ass’n, 292 F.3d at 862–63 (internal quotation omitted).  
 On appeal, Ispat/Inland contests the ALJ’s findings concerning legal 
pneumoconiosis and disability causation. Ispat/Inland argues the ALJ, in according less 
weight to the testimony of a physician who theorized that the contribution of coal dust 
exposure to Curtis’ pulmonary impairment was ―clinically insignificant‖ in light of his 
well-documented smoking history, effectively fashioned an irrebuttable presumption in 
favor of entitlement to benefits under BLBA. That is, by crediting medical testimony 
ascribing Curtis’ lung disease to both coal dust exposure and cigarette smoke over 
testimony pinning the obstruction solely on cigarette smoke, the ALJ impermissibly 
facilitated Curtis’ efforts to demonstrate disease causation. Ispat/Inland argues this 
adjudicatory tack leads invariably to the awarding of benefits under BLBA despite the 
theoretically disproportionate contributions of cigarette inhalation and coal dust exposure 
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 The ALJ concluded Curtis was entitled to this presumption. The Tenth Circuit has 
concluded this presumption applies strictly to claims of clinical pneumoconiosis and does 
not extend to claims of legal pneumoconiosis. Andersen, 455 F.3d at 1105–06. 
Nevertheless, because a finding of legal pneumoconiosis subsumes a finding of disease 
causation, the Board reasoned the ALJ’s misguided application of the presumption was 
harmless error. We concur. 
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to a miner’s pulmonary disorder. For the reasons outlined below, Ispat/Inland’s argument 
fails.
3
 
II. 
 In January 2009, the ALJ awarded Curtis’ claim for benefits based on a finding of 
legal pneumoconiosis. The ALJ found Curtis worked thirteen years in coal mine 
employment and had smoked ―between 50 and 60 [cigarette] pack years.‖ Based on his 
assessment of eleven x-ray interpretations, the ALJ found the evidence insufficient to 
establish the presence of clinical pneumoconiosis. See 20 C.F.R. § 718.202(a)(1) (―A 
chest X-ray conducted and classified in accordance with § 718.102 may form the basis 
for a finding of the existence of pneumoconiosis.‖). However, the ALJ also assessed 
testimony proffered by five medical witnesses and concluded Curtis had satisfied his 
burden of establishing legal pneumoconiosis. See 20 C.F.R. § 718.202(a)(4) (―A 
determination of the existence of pneumoconiosis may also be made if a physician, 
exercising sound medical judgment, notwithstanding a negative X-ray, finds that the 
                                                 
3
 We review a Board decision to determine whether an error of law has been made and 
whether the Board has adhered to its own standard of review. Lombardy v. Dir., OWCP, 
355 F.3d 211, 213 (3d Cir. 2004). We review questions of law de novo, and we note the 
Board is bound by an ALJ’s findings of fact ―if they are supported by substantial 
evidence in the record considered as a whole.‖ Id. ―Appellate review thus necessarily 
entails an independent review of the record and a decision as to whether the 
administrative law judge’s findings were supported by substantial evidence.‖ 
Consolidation Coal Co. v. Kramer, 305 F.3d 203, 207 (3d Cir. 2002). ―If substantial 
evidence exists, we must affirm the ALJ’s interpretation of the evidence even if we might 
have interpreted the evidence differently in the first instance.‖ Balsavage v. Dir., OWCP, 
295 F.3d 390, 395 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation omitted). 
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miner suffers or suffered from pneumoconiosis as defined in § 718.201. . . . Such a 
finding shall be supported by a reasoned medical opinion.‖). 
 The parties stipulated that Curtis suffers from a totally disabling chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease. Thus, as to both disease and disability causation, the 
unifying question on appeal is whether Curtis demonstrated his condition was caused, in 
some material part, by his occupational exposure to coal mine dust. On this issue, the 
testimony of three physicians is germane.
4
 Dr. Donald L. Rasmussen, a medical witness 
whose report was submitted by Curtis, conceded cigarette smoke was likely a more 
determinative factor in Curtis’ obstruction than was coal mine dust but concluded the 
dust exposure was ―significant‖ and had ―contribute[d] in a material way to his disabling 
lung disease.‖ Dr. John E. Parker, another medical witness whose report was submitted 
by Curtis, cited a wealth of research attesting to the causal link between coal dust and 
obstructive lung disease and similarly fixed blame for Curtis’ obstruction on both coal 
dust and tobacco smoke. To the contrary, Dr. Gregory J. Fino, Ispat/Inland’s medical 
witness, placed sole responsibility for the pulmonary condition on cigarette smoke and 
opined that coal dust exposure was ―of no clinical significance‖ in Curtis’ case. He also 
concluded that, even if Curtis suffered from pneumoconiosis, his disability was caused 
uniquely by cigarette smoke. 
                                                 
4
 The ALJ accorded little weight to the opinions of Drs. Celko and Altmeyer. Because 
Ispat/Inland has not contested these evaluations, we will devote the bulk of our analysis 
to the three medical opinions most heavily relied upon by the ALJ. 
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 The ALJ found the testimony of Drs. Rasmussen and Parker more persuasive than 
the opinion forwarded by Dr. Fino. Specifically, he found Dr. Fino ―failed to explain how 
the literature related to [Curtis’] case‖ and could not offer a convincing explanation for 
how he had managed to distinguish the effects of cigarette smoke from the effects of coal 
dust in this instance. The Board affirmed, holding the ALJ had acted within his discretion 
in discounting Dr. Fino’s opinion and in concomitantly crediting the pneumoconiosis 
diagnoses offered by Drs. Rasmussen and Parker. 
 We too conclude the ALJ acted properly in scrutinizing and weighing the 
competing medical testimony. Under the BLBA’s adjudicatory scheme, the ALJ 
―evaluate[s] the reasoning and credibility‖ of medical opinions, Kertesz v. Crescent Hills 
Coal Co., 788 F.2d 158, 163 (3d Cir. 1986), and ―has discretion to accord varying weight 
to physician testimony,‖ Consolidation Coal Co. v. Kramer, 305 F.3d 203, 207 n.7 (3d 
Cir. 2002). At no point did the ALJ or the Board afford Curtis the benefit of a 
presumption that his obstruction or his total disability arose out of coal dust exposure. 
Instead, the ALJ assessed the medical evidence regarding the etiology of Curtis’ 
condition and found the diagnoses offered by Drs. Rasmussen and Parker comparatively 
credible. The ALJ found their opinions — which factored into the equation Curtis’ 
smoking and employment histories — squarely supported by adequate data and sound 
analysis. Neither witness blindly assumed Curtis suffered from legal pneumoconiosis 
simply by virtue of his affliction with a chronic pulmonary condition, and the ALJ did not 
make this inferential leap on the issue of disease causation without first rigorously 
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evaluating the competing testimony. The burden remained on Curtis to demonstrate 
disease causation, and the ALJ properly determined he had satisfied this burden by 
presenting medical testimony that weighed in his favor. See 20 C.F.R. § 718.202(a)(4). 
 ―Whether a medical opinion is reasoned . . . is a decision that rests ultimately with 
the ALJ . . . . The ALJ needs only to be persuaded, on the basis of all available evidence, 
that pneumoconiosis is a contributing cause of the miner’s disability.‖ Freeman United 
Coal Mining Co. v. Summers, 272 F.3d 473, 483 (7th Cir. 2001). Here, the ALJ found Dr. 
Fino’s opinion deficient in several respects. Critically, both the ALJ and the Board found 
Dr. Fino failed to articulate a viable explanation for why the selections from the relevant 
medical literature upon which he relied were directly applicable to Curtis. Quite clearly, 
the ALJ did not discredit Dr. Fino’s testimony simply because it posited cigarette smoke 
as the sole underlying cause of Curtis’ condition. Indeed, far from overlooking the 
potentially confounding influence of cigarette smoke in Black Lung cases in which x-ray 
evidence does not demonstrate the existence of clinical pneumoconiosis, the ALJ 
prefaced his decision by acknowledging a claimant’s cigarette smoking history ―is of 
particular importance because the pulmonary manifestations of smoking are often similar 
to [those] of coal workers’ pneumoconiosis.‖  
 Based on the available evidence, the ALJ reasonably concluded coal dust exposure 
was a significant contributing cause of Curtis’ chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, 
and that Curtis’ condition therefore comports with the statutory definition of legal 
pneumoconiosis. See 30 U.S.C. §902(b); 20 C.F.R. § 718.201(a)(2). The ALJ acted 
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within his discretion in crediting the testimony of Drs. Rasmussen and Parker over the 
testimony of Dr. Fino and in determining Curtis had satisfied each element of entitlement 
to benefits based on this medical testimony.
5
  
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review and affirm the 
order of the Benefits Review Board. 
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 The Board declined to review the ALJ’s finding of disability causation under 20 C.F.R. 
§ 718.204(c) because Ispat/Inland had neglected to challenge the issue on appeal. In 
affirming the ALJ’s award of benefits, our reasoning applies with equal force to both 
disease and disability causation. 
